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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
77-14-5. Hearing on mental condition of defendant found not guilty by rea-
son of insanity — Commitment to state hospital — Procedure for release. (1) 
When a jury renders a verdict or a court enters a finding of "not guilty b> reason 
of meftfcrf illness" purauant to section 76 2 305 insanity", the court shall proceed 
then conduct a hearing within five days to determine whether ]f the defendant bas 
recovered from bis meirtftl illness is presently mentally ill The defense counsel and 
prosecutors ma^ reguest further evaluations and may present testimony from those 
examiners. ti-f after wearing, ttre ueienutim » m m mmm xo TTC niuiwnj m, mc 
eourt shall order )»m eommittcd to tbe Utah state hospital F^be defendant sbaH 
not be released from confinement therein until the eot*rt which eommittcd the 
defendant shall, after hearing, ftnd tfcat the defendant fras recovered from hte men-
tai iHrtess- Notke sfcaH be given to the prosecuting attorney of the hearing 
(2) After the hearing and upon consideration of the record, jf _the court finds 
by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is still mentally ill and because 
of that mental illness presents a substantial danger to himself or others, the court 
shall order him committed to the Utah state hospital The defendant shall not be 
released from confinement therein until the court which comitted the defendant 
shall, after hearing, find that the defendant has recovered from his mental illness 
JNotice shall be given to the prosecuting attorney of the hearing For purposes of 
this section, a person affected with a mental illness which is iri remission as a 
result of medication or hospitalization shall remain committed to the Utah state 
hospital if it can be determined within reasonable medical probability that without 
continued medication or hospitalization the defendant's mental illness \ull reoccur, 
thereby making the person a substantial danger to himself or others 
(8) (3) A defendant committed to the Utah state hospital pursuant to subsection 
W 121 m a y aPPty» n(>t sooner than six months from the date of the commitment, 
to the district court of the county from which he was committed, for an order of 
release on the grounds that he has recovered from his mental illness At an} time 
that the defendant has recovered from his mental illness, the clinical director of 
the state hospital shall certify that fact to the court The court shall conduct a 
hearing within ten working days of the receipt of the clinical director's report If 
the finding is adverse to the defendant, he shall not be permitted another hearing 
more often than once each year, unless the court otherwise orders In such hear-
ings, the burden of proof is on the applicant. 
- i i i -
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the District Court properly refused to 
release defendant from the Utah State Hospital based on medical 
opinions that defendant suffered from no mental illness other 
than mild mental retardation but that he should not be released 
because it would be dangerous to defendant and others. 
2. Whether the District Court properly denied 
defendant's request for conditional release where such release is 
provided under civil commitment statutes but not under the 
criminal commitment of insanity acquittees statutes. 
-iv-
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
BERNT MURPHY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 19824 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
The State incorporates the Statement of the Case made 
in its previous brief in this case with the following additional 
information: 
On February 5, 1985 defense counsel requested an annual 
report from the Utah State Hospital on defendant's current mental 
condition in preparation for defendant's annual court review 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-5(3) (Supp. 1983) (See 
Appellant's Brief, Addendum A). Doctors Austin, Howell and 
Groesbeck responded with a letter to Judge David B. Dee of the 
Third Judicial District Court (See Appendix A and R. 827A). The 
doctors wrote that defendant no longer displayed symptoms of a 
mental illness other than mild mental retardation. They did notf 
however, recommend defendant's release from the State Hospital 
because "he lacks the social skills and controls necessary to 
function anywhere but in a highly-structured in-patient setting 
and lacks the ability to provide for the basic necessities of 
life or his own welfare" (Appendix Af R. 827A). 
On April 30, 1985, Judge Dee heard testimony from the 
three doctors concerning defendant's mental condition pursuant to 
defendant's petition for release under § 77-14-5(3). The doctors 
again recommended against defendant's release but reiterated that 
he had recovered from any mental illness he may have suffered 
other than mental retardation. Based on the doctor's testimonyf 
Judge Dee denied defendant's request for release (R. 863). 
Defendant filed a notice of appeal from Judge Dee's 
April 30, 1985 decision. On May 8f 1985 defendant and the State 
stipulated to consolidation of the appeal from the 1985 hearing 
with the appeal from the 1984 hearing. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State incorporates the Statement of Facts 
previously submitted in its original brief with the following 
additional facts: 
In April 1985, Dr. Van 0. Austin testified that 
defendant had mild mental retardation and an adult adjustment 
disorder in January of 1984 (R. 829). Dr. Austin added that 
defendant's medical history included diagnosis of psychosis but 
that he did not see a firm basis for that diagnosis (R. 830). 
The primary past diagnosesf according to Dr. Austin, were mild 
mental retardation and various personality disorders (R. 830). 
Dr. Austin felt defendant had become more responsible and more 
functional than he was in January of 1984 but that he continued 
to display angry outbursts not approaching the level or frequency 
of the past (R. 831). Dr. Austin opined that defendant had 
recovered from any mental illness he may have suffered in the 
-2-
past, if in fact he suffered a mental illness (R. 832). 
Defendant displays antisocial featuresf mainly conflict of 
authorityf but these are not severe enough to support a diagnosis 
of a personality disorder (R. 833). 
Dr. Austin did not in April of 1985 recommend 
defendants release because he felt that defendant may be 
dangerous to himself because he lacked the skills to function in 
society and that he may be dangerous to others because of poor 
judgment and sexual maturity (R. 833-34). The danger defendant 
poses, howeverf Dr. Austin felt was not the result of a mental 
illness (R. 833f 834). Dr. Austin does not consider mental 
retardation to be a mental illness even though it is listed as 
such in the DSM-III (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual) (R. 835-
836). 
In January 1984, Dr. Austin testified that defendant 
was mildly retarded and suffered from an adjustment disorder and 
an underlying thought disorder which he could not specifically 
classify (R. 401-402, 407). However, Dr. Austin also referred to 
the thought disorder in 1984 as: 
An underlying psychotic disorder, a thought 
process disorder, which I cannot and have not 
been able to over the years classify 
specifically as a schizophrenia or as a 
depressive psychotic reaction or paranoid 
reaction or whatever . . . I have seen 
evidence as recently as May of '83 of what I 
feel are inappropriate thought processes, 
delusions or whatever. And I further base 
the belief that there's an underlying 
psychotic disorder to the fact he seemed to 
function so well while on a fairly large, 
high dose of Navane, 35 mg a day, and has 
deteriorated rapidly since off the medication 
and functioned so poorly since off the 
medication . . . 
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In April 1985 Dr. Robert Howell testified that he had 
found defendant to be mildly retarded and to have an adult 
adjustment disorder but nothing more in January of 1984 (R. 842). 
Dr. Howell felt that defendants mental condition had improved 
since January of 1984 because his environment was more structured 
(R. 842). Defendant remains mildly retarded and displays 
aggressiveness and dependency (R. 844) but Dr. Austin would not 
label these traits as a personality disorder (R. 844-845). Dr. 
Austin agreed that defendant should not be released because he 
cannot adjust to society (R. 845-846). There has been a great 
deal of confusion over the years as to what if any mental illness 
defendant suffered and Dr. Howell stated that he believed 
defendant should not have presented an insanity defense in the 
first place (R. 846). Dr. Howell did not mention that belief 
before 1985 because he was concerned about defendant's 
"instability in the hospitalf which we called an adjustment 
disorder, that in good conscience I couldn't [mention it] last 
year" (R. 847). 
In January of 1984, however Dr. Howell testified that 
defendant's impulsivenessf poor judgment in interpersonal 
relationships and bending of reality to fit his own inner needs 
indicate "that we're dealing with a psychotic process that is very 
likely schizophrenia" (R. 483f 485). Dr. Howell noted that 
defendant functioned much better in the testing that occurred in 
1972 than he did at the time of the hearing in January of 1984 (R. 
485). Dr. Howell opined that defendant would never recover from 
the mental illness known as retardation and that absent 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. The District Court, in weighing all of the 
evidence; including medical opinions, the crime of which defendant 
was acquitted and the protection of defendant and society; 
properly denied defendant's request for release. Although the 
doctors1 credibility on the question of defendant's recovery may 
be questionable, all agree that defendant should remain 
hospitalized. Even if defendant no longer suffers from a mental 
illness aside from retardation, or never did, he properly remains 
in custody as a retarded person who was acquitted of a violent 
crime after pleading the insanity defense and who remains 
dangerous to himself and others. 
POINT II. The District Court properly refused to order 
the State to provide conditional release programs to defendant 
because such programs are not available under Utah's statutory 
scheme to criminal insanity acquittees. Moreover, mandamus cannot 
lie where there is no clear statutory duty which the State has 
refused to perform. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO RELEASE 
DEFENDANT BASED ON THE EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED AT THE HEARING. 
Defendant argues that the evidence presented at the 
April 1985 hearing revealed that he suffers from nothing other 
than mental retardation. He further alleges, with some support 
from the hearing testimony, that he never suffered from any mental 
illness other than retardation that was sufficient grounds for his 
-6-
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defendant remains a danger to himself and others. Based on this 
evidence, Judge Dee properly denied defendants request for 
release. 
Defendant urges this Court to overturn Jacob and hold 
that dangerousness is not a proper criterion for denying release 
under § 77-14-5(3) because it is not specifically mentioned in 
that subsection of the statute. Dangerousness is, however, a 
criterion for commitment under subsection (2) of § 77-14-5. It 
seems inconsistent to say that dangerousness is grounds for 
commitment but that a court considering release of a criminally 
committed individual may not consider whether he remains 
dangerous. The words "recovered from his mental illness" would be 
meaningless unless they are related to the grounds for commitment, 
i.e. dangerousness. c.f. Newton v. Brooks. 426 P.2d 446 (Ore. 
1967) (term "until he becomes sane" meaningless unless related to 
dangerousness which is reason for commitment). 
Defendant asserts also that the evidence adduced at the 
April 1985 hearing reveals that he is merely mentally retarded and 
that this alone is an insufficient basis for his continued 
confinement. The testimony of the three doctors, however, is not 
binding on the court. The determination of continuing 
dangerousness or recovery from mental illness should be a legal 
rather than a purely medical decision in which the court weighs 
all of the evidence, including medical opinions, the nature of the 
crime involved and protection of the public and reaches an 
independent judgment. Application of Noel. 601 P.2d 1152 (Kan. 
1979) . 
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Furthermore, the doctors' testimony is not entirely 
credible on the issue of defendant's recovery or previous 
suffering from mental illness because two of the doctors appear to 
be espousing opinions on defendant's mental condition which are 
inconsistent with their own previous opinions. Doctors Austin and 
Howell both testified in January 1984 that defendant suffered from 
some form of psychosis. Yet, in April 1985, both testified that 
defendant may never have suffered from a mental illness other than 
mental retardation. Both Austin and Howell seemed to believe that 
retardation is not a mental illness although the DSM-III lists it 
as a mental illness and the Utah Code includes it as a mental 
disease or defect. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (1978). 
All three doctors appear to be playing both ends 
against the middle in claiming that defendant has recovered from 
his mental illness, if he ever suffered from one, but that he 
remains dangerous to himself and others. The hospital staff is 
now in a position to protect itself from attack on all fronts 
regardless of whether defendant is released. To the State, they 
may say, "We told the courts defendant should not be released, it 
is not our fault." Yet they may also say to the defendant, "We 
told the courts you were not mentally ill, it is not our fault." 
c.f. Application of Noel, 601 P.2d at 1168. Such an approach puts 
the court in a difficult position which the court should resolve 
in favor of public safety. See State v. Taylor. 491 P.2d 877, 881 
(Mont. 1971). Judge Dee properly determined that the weight of 
the evidence in favor of releasing defendant did not outweigh the 
public's special interest in his continuing confinement. Id. 
-9-
Other courts have noted that dangerousness as a 
standard for release provides a safety valve by which confinement 
of a criminal acquittee may be continued where the evidence 
offered by the defendant is that he has recovered from his mental 
illness. See, e.g. State v. Taylor, 491 P.2d at 879; Newton v, 
BrooksP 426 P.2d at 449. These courts refer to the comments 
accompanying the legislation establishing dangerousness as a 
criterion for release. These comments point out that a criminally 
committed person who may be greatly improved may remain dangerous 
because of factors in his personality and background other than 
mental disease, id. The dangerousness standard also provides the 
means for controlling the occasional dangerous defendant who 
successfully feigned mental illness to gain acquittal. 2d. 
Defendant argues also that mental retardation is not a 
mental illness and thatr based on retardation alone, there is no 
basis for his continued custody nor was there ever a basis for his 
confinement at the State Hospital. On the contrary, however, 
defendant was properly committed to the State Hospital in 1972 and 
properly remains in custody there. In 1972, at the time of 
defendant's trial, and in 1957, the time of the crime, persons who 
were found not guilty by reason of insanity were subject to 
commitment to the Utah State Hospital, just as they are today (See 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-15 (1953, repealed 1980). After all, 
defendant plead and was found not guilty by reason of insanity in 
1972. Defendant should not be allowed to use the insanity defense 
to gain acquittal of a serious, violent crime and then step back 
years later saying that he should not have been successful in such 
a defense because his mental defect did not qualify. 
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Furthermore/ persons of unsound minds were excused from 
criminal responsibility for intentional crimes and insane persons 
as well as retarded persons were considered to be of unsound mind 
in 1957 and 1972. (See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-21 (1953f repealed 
1973). Most importantlyr the Rules of Construction of the 1953 
Code define the words "insane person" as including "idiots, 
lunatics, distracted persons and persons of unsound mind" (See 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(16) (1953). The Rules of Construction 
apply "unless such construction would be inconsistent with the 
manifest intent of the legislature or repugnant to the context of 
the statute." Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12 (1953). Thus, it appears 
that defendant did, in factf qualify for the insanity defense even 
if he was merely mentally retarded at the time of the crime. 
Because retarded persons were excused from criminal 
responsibility for intentional crimes along with insane persons, 
it is reasonable that the Legislature intended to include 
retardation as a grounds for a verdict of not guilty by reason of 
insanity. Thusf in 1972f defendant properly plead and was found 
not guilty by reason of insanity even if he was, as he claims, 
only mentally retarded and not suffering from any other mental 
illness. Moreover, defendants claim that inclusion of mental 
retardation as a mental illness under current release standards 
would be ex post facto as applied to him fails on this basis. 
Defendant further complains that he has been confined 
for a period which he believes is longer than the prison term he 
would have served had he been found guilty of raping a five-year-
old child. The sentence for rape of a child under 13 years of age 
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in 1957 and in 1972 was not less than 20 years and which may be 
for life. Utah Code Ann. § 76-53-18 (1953, repealed 1973). While 
there is the possibility that a person convicted of raping a child 
would have been paroled earlier, it is not certain that such an 
individual would not remain confined for life. Even if defendant 
might have been released from a prison sentence before now, the 
potential sentence for a crime is irrelevant to the length and 
purpose of the commitment of an insanity acquittee. Stoneberg v. 
£ta±J£f 681 P.2d 994 (Idaho 1984). The purpose of commitment of an 
insanity acquittee is treatment of the illness and to protect the 
acquittee and society from potential dangerousness. Jones v. 
United States, U.S. , 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 
(1983). For these reasons, an insanity acquittee may be confined 
until he is no longer insane or dangerous. Id. 
The evidence adduced at the 1985 hearing lends no 
further support to defendant's claim of recovery than did the 
evidence adduced at the 1984 hearing. It is unfortunate for 
defendant, yet true that all of the medical experts remain 
conviced that defendant should not be released because he is 
dangerous to himself and/or others. That defendant continues to 
receive medication, although milder medication, is evidence, of 
this reality. Based on this evidence, Judge Dee could not 
properly have ordered defendant's release on the grounds that he 
had recovered from his mental illness. While Judge Dee's language 
is not entirely clear in outlining what standard the court applied 
in denying defendant's release, it appears that the standard was 
dangerousness to himself and/or others from the context of the 
-12-
ruling as a whole. For these reasons, the District Court's ruling 
should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
REQUEST FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS. 
As argued in Point IV of the State's original brief, 
Judge Dee properly denied defendant's request for a writ of 
mandamus in 1984 and, as argued below, again properly denied the 
same request in 1985. This is true for several reasons, the first 
and foremost of which is that a criminally committed individual is 
not entitled to conditional release. State v. Jacob, 669 P.2d 
865, 869, 870 (Utah 1983); State v. Lindquist. 674 P.2d 1234, 
1238, n. 22 (Utah 1983). The programs which defendant requests 
providing for extensive supervision, training and housing 
accommodations are, in essence, a conditional release. It is also 
questionable, considering the defendant's need for security 
measures, whether conditional release would even result in a less 
restrctive alternative for defendant. As indicated by Doctors 
Austin, Howell and Groesbeck, defendant requires a setting equal 
in security and structure to the State Hospital. It is 
questionable whether such a structure could be provided outside of 
the Hospital. Even if it could, it appears that the State would 
be in the position of providing a facility, for defendant alone, 
which duplicated the facilities already available at the State 
Hospital. 
Finally, mandamus does not lie in this case because 
there is no clear statutory duty to provide the services to an 
insanity acquittee which are requested by defendant. Defendant 
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must show that a clear statutory duty exists which the State has 
refused to perform before the relief requested can be granted. 
Garcia Vt Jones, 29 Utah 2d 409r 411, 510 P.2d 1099, 1100 (1973); 
Archer v. Utah State Land Board, 15 Utah 2d 321, 323, 392 P.2d 
622, 623 (1964) • The statutes cited by defendant which he claims 
require the State to provide such services do not apply to 
criminal insanity acquittees but merely to civil committees or to 
persons not committable but who require limited services. E.g. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 55-19-1 through 55-19-9 (Supp. 1983) and § 64-7-
30 (Supp. 1983). Defendant fits into neither of the latter 
categories. Judge Dee, therefore, could not properly have applied 
those statutes to defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
The State requests this Court to affirm the decisions 
of the District Court in 1984 and 1985 denying defendant's request 
for release under § 77-14-5(3). Should this Court reverse the 
District Court1s ruling, the State requests that defendant's 
release be stayed for a definite, limited period of time to 
provide the State an opportunity to institute civil commitment 
proceedings or to implement the programs required for defendant's 
care outside of the State Hospital. The State requests, 
therefore, that this case, in the event of a reversal, be remanded 
to the District Court for a hearing to determine the length of 
time necessary to implement such programs. Should this Court 
determine the District Court did not clearly articulate and relate 
the denial of release to the dangerousness criterion, the State 
requests a remand for written findings clarifying the ruling. 
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DATED th is Irk day of June, 1985. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM 
APPENDIX A 
1885 [ilijj. 1985 
UTAH STATE HOSPITAL 
100 Years 0t Service 
February 26, 1985 
The Honorable David B. Dee 
Judge of the Third Judicial District Court 
240 East 400 South 
.Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
re: MURPHY, Bernt 
Case Number: 15606 
Dear Judge Dee: 
The following is a yearly treatment progess report on Bernt Murphy: 
Since our 1984 report to the court Bernt has displayed some improvement. 
During the past year we have seen no indicationss of the signs and symptoms 
which have characterized our previous diagnosis of mental illness. However, 
he is still, and will remain, mildly mentally retarded. He continues to 
display emotional and behavioral lability and impulsivity, unrealistic 
expectations of his skills and abilities, poor social skills, and inappro-
priate sexual impulses and controls* Although these are not healthy 
features, they do not approach the threshold necessary to diagnose a 
mental illness. 
During the past year the treating staff has given him the opportunity 
to participate in industrial assignments. His supervisors report that 
he has been a very good and reliable worker. In addition, since December 
he has been allowed to go on "home visits'* to his aunts' house in West 
Jordan and has functioned without incident. However, his participation in 
the industrial assignment and his last home visit were both curtailed as the 
result of recent apparently unprovoked violent threats to another patient 
and staff members. 
If the court*continues his present commitment, the treatment staff plans to 
continue counseling, encourage participation in industrial assignments, 
Structured participation in a sheltered workshop, more frequent home visits, 
and counseling to ensure that the home visits are both appropriate and 
and productive. 
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We are not recommending Bernt*s release since we feel that releasing 
him from the state hospital would be doing a disservice to Bernt and 
the community. We feel that he lacks the social skills and controls 
necessary to function anywhere but in a highly-structured inpatient 
retting and lacks the ability to provide for the basic necessities of 
life or his own welfare. We feel that however well-intentioned, his 
release from the state hospital would rapidly become a social and 
individual disaster. 
However, we are prepared to certify to the court that Mr. Murphy does 
not currently have a mental disease. He does continue to have mild 
mental retardation. 
Sincerely, 
VAN 0. AUSTIN, M.D. 
Forensic Psychiatrist 
ROBERT J. HOWELL, Ph.D. 
Clinical and Forensic Psychology 
C. JESS GROESBECK, M.D. 
Clinical Director 
VOA:lc 
cc: Creighton Horton, Esq., Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
Brooke Wells, Esq., Defense Attorney 
Byron Stark, Salt Lake County Clerk's Office 
